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Corporatism and Development 
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Kozo Kato 
1. Introduction 
German poIicy in a field of development cooperation has 
evolved flexibly， with Iitle alteration during the entire postwar pe-
riod， reflecting出einterests and values of domestic actors such as 
labor， churches， and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in 
policy formulation and implementation. Political analysis of Ger-
man domestic institutions works well to explain the stable pattern 
of development cooperation policy. Peter Katzenstein， for example， 
argues出atGerman policies， domestic or foreign， tend to display 
continuity， rather than change， because the power of the decentral-
ized German state has been tamed by a centralized society that ex-
ercises influence through three institutional nodes: poIitical parties， 
para-pubIic institutions， and cooperative federaIism.(l) The German 
term 'self-help' (selbsthilfe)， one of key words in German develop-
ment poIicy， exactly reflects this societal influence on poIicy-
making. German development cooperation， both in Germany and 
overseas， emphasizes the importance of fostering strength within a ー 、 ? 、 、??
??
(1) Peter J. Katzenstein， Policy and PoIitics in West Germany: 
The Growth of a Semisoverign State (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press， 1987). 
1 
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The ultimate goal is social relationship of mutual interdependence. 
to help the Germans and local people in developing countries create 
Thus the government does not hesitate to use Ger-a civil society. 
man foreign aid to further the mixed policy goals of domestic eco・
For example， German for-nomic interests and humanitarian goals. 
eign aid has been frequently used to save jobs for the German peo・
ple by tying the aid to German exports and humanitarian aid for 
disaster relief and educational programs often subordinat田 eco・
nomic development to democratization. (2) 
I. Corporatism and German Policy-making 
German domestic institutions are rightly characterized as cor・
They are rule-driven and have institutionalized political poratist. 
opportunities for centralized societal actors to participate in state 
policy-making and assure political compensations and subsidies for 
These corporatist institutions， 
(2) Interviews， Bonn， Nos.28 and 33， June 1 and 20， 1994; Organiza-
tion for Economic Co司operationand Development (OECD)，担d
Review 1993/94: Memorandum of Germany， 1 February 1994 
(unpublished paper)， p.40. Thβlogic of development is reversed 
in the J apanese analysis， sothat democracy follows economic 
growth. Thus， the Japanese tend to de日ne出econ四 ptof self-
help Uijo doryoku) in a macro-economic， Rostownian sense， and 
provides economic assistance to help “self-help efforts of deべrel-
oping countries toward economic take-off." Consequently， Ja-
pan's implementation of is adjusted ac芯ordingto the develop-
ment stage of the recipient country. Japan's Official Develop-
ment Assistance Charter (pamphlet)， p.1; The Ministry of For-
eign Affairs (MOF A)， Japan's ODA， 1994 (Tokyo: Association 
for Promotion of International Cooperation)， p.7. 
parties affected by external forces. 
???
? ?
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like Japanese informationx-rich institutions， reduce risks and uncer 
tainties (transaction costs)川
The general argument that corpo1'atist arrangements are organ司
izational responses to the rapidly expanding societal needs of ad-
vanced capitalism in the late twentieth century holds for Germany.(l) 
German corporatist institutions provide societal acto1's with a 1'eli-
economlc exogeロousf1'om that protects them net able safety 
shocks. The safety net has been based upon the ideology of the so-
ac1vocates ¥vhich Ma:γktVJirtschajt Soziale economy ma1'ket cial 
avoiding“both unregulated market competition and total govern-
???
? ?
ment planning.川 5) The risks and uncertainties involved in social in-
Peter J. Katzenstein，“Stability andchange in the Emerging 
Third Republic，" in Katzenstein ed.， 1n白grr_担dPoli豆色in
West Germany: Toward the Third I~epublìc (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press， 1988)， p.346. 
Philippe C. Schmitte1'，“Stil the Century of Corporatism?" in 
Philippe C. Schmitter and Gerald Lehmbruch， eds.， T1'ends to-
ward Corporatist Intermediation (London: Sage Publication， 
1979)， pp. 7-52 ; Peter J. Katzenstein， '<:2i阻 ghE2Mp出堕ι
Aust1'ia， Switzerland， and the Politics 0f Industry (Ithaca: Corω 
nell University Press， 1984); Jonas Pontusson， ，‘Labor， Capital-
ism， and Industrial Policy: The Swedish Case in Comparative 
Perspective，" Comparative Politics 23， 2 (J anuary 1991)， 163-79. 
Corporatism， according to Schmitter，“can be traced primarily 
to the imperative necessity for a stable， bourgeoisie-dominant 
regime， due to processes of concentration of ownership， compe-
tition between national economies， expansion of the role of 
public policy and rationalization of decision-making within the 
state to associate or incorporate subordinate c1asses and status 
groups more closely within the political process." (pp.24司25)
Katzenstein， Between Power and Plenty， p.316; Policy and 
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itiatives have been minimized by concerted action Konzertierte Ak 
tion between the state and society in policy formulation and imple-
mentation. In the process of concerted action，“affected groups 
trade their advance commitment to live by a particular set of rules 
regarding policy implementa tion against the assurance that their 
political demands wiIl be heeded in the process of policy formula-
tion."(o) German societal demands， usually centralized around peak 
associations， have been injected into decision-making in the decen-
tralized state through (i) political parties that usually form some 
sort of coalition government; (i) cooperative federalism that Iinks 
national， state， and local government; and (ii) parapublic institu-
tions that promote political exchanges between state and society. 
The legislative process in parIiament is less important than direct 
cooperation between interest groups and the ministerial bureauc-
racy. Among advanced industrial countτies， the German arrange-
ment is most similar to the democratic corporatism of European 
small states， and is quite unlike policy formulation in the United 
States or Japan. Because political stability is the ultimate objective 
of German policy making， the policy produced usually emphasizes 
continuity， rather than change， and when change occurs， itis slow 
and incr官 nental.(7) 
(6) Katzenstein， Policy and Politics in Germany， p.384. 
三 (7) Peter J. Katzenstein， Policy and Po!itics in West Germany， pp.3 
八 -82;Katzenstein， SmalI States in WorId Markets， p.200; Mi-
chael Kreile，“West Germany: The Dynamics of Expansion，" in 
4 Katzenstein， ed.， Betweeま1Power and Plenty， pp.198-200. For a 
detailed disαlssion of German cooperative federalism， see Jefゅ
frey J. Anderson， The Territorial Imperative: Pluralism， Corpo-
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This conservatism has been prominent in both industrial and 
It has often been development cooperation policy in Germany. 
pointed out that the federal government keeps its hands off troubled 
firms， leaving rescue operations to banks or regional governrnents. 
Federal governrnent intervention has been a last resort， and， 
when action has been necessary， the governrnent has shunned own-
However， when do-ership solutions in favor of indirect rneasures.<討}
mestic industries rneet foreign cornpetition and request state assis-
tance， Gerrnan industrial policy shifts frorn a liberal rnarket-ori-
ln the 1970 s， for ented policy toward a corporatist social policy. 
exarnple， the shipbui1ding industry， facing losses due to cornpetition 
from developing countries， sought cornpensation in order to delay 
As a any costly adjustment to the international division of labor. 
result， al Gerrnan foreign aid related to shipbuilding was tied to 
To surnrnarize， inGerrnany procurement frorn German suppliers. 
???
? ?
societal interests and ideologies are allowed to predorninate in or・
ratisrn， and Econornic Crisis (Carnbridge: Carnbridge University 
Pr白s，1992)， pp.144-86. 
(8) . J effrey A. Hart，“West Gerrnan lndustrial Policy，" in Barfield 
& Scharnbra， eds.， The Politics of lndustrial Policy (Washing-
ton， DC.: Arnerican Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Re-
search， 1986)， pp.161・86.ln the sarne vein， Krei1e also maintains 
that the social rnarket econorny“implied a clear-cut separation 
of powers in the e氾onomicsphere: the econornic process was 
essentially to be left to the self一町gulatingrnechanism of the 
rnarket. The state had to lay down the rules of the game to as-
surne some responsibility for the growth in general，" Michael 
Kreile，“West Gerrnany: The Dynarnics of Expansion，" in 
Katzenstein， ed.， Between Power and Ple恒ty，p.198. 
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1n other words， Ger-der to maintain domestic political stability. 
many sacrifices economic efficiency in exchange for stability. 
II. Development Cooperation Policy in Corporatism 
decentralize the which Corporatist institutions in Germany， 
policy-making process while centralizing the representation of so・
cietal actors， have contributed to the continuity in German policy. 
policy-cooperation development 11 involvement Societal 
making is a precondition for the stabiIity of German politics， rather 
than a supplement to the state's international cooperation policy. 
That participation has transformed foreign economic policy into so-
cial policy intended to realize societal interests and values.附 Thus，
German international cooperation is less a response to structural 
change in the international economy than the fruit of societal needs 
both in Germany and internationally. 
In the following， 1 will examine (1) in what way the Ministry of 
Economic Cooperation (BMZ) and other development cooperation 
agencies are decentralized; (2) to what extent societal actors such 
as development NGOs， churches， political foundations， labor organi-
zations， and business associations are centralized and heavily in-
volved in the policy-making process; and (3) how the German fi-
nancial system transfers costs associated with interdependence with 
developing countries to state financial institutions. 
(9) For a similar view， see Manfred Glagow and Uwe Schimank， 
“Korporatistische Verwaltung: Das Beispiel Entwicklungspoli-
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5tate and 50ciety A. 
Cooperation Economic of 5tate--Ministry Decentralized 
(8MZ) 
、 ? ， ，?ー
The decentraIization of development cooperation is most ob司
servable in the encroachments of other ministries on the Federal 
Two‘thirds of German Ministry of Economic Cooperation (BMZ). 
Seemingly the ODA disbursements come through the BMZ budget. 
single point of responsibility for development cooperation policy 
and a model of an integrated executive office--and often mentioned 
as such by Japanese critics of their own government's lack of 
coordination--the BMZ is， in fact， institutionally weak and only 
Before the crea tion of BMZ， 16 departments， semi-independent. (10) 
with 231 offices were in charge of German development assistance. 
Far from streamIining this bureaucratic complexity， these depart-
ments and offices were not closed down but remained in several 
The ministers of the BMZ have not been powerful ministries. 
Since its inauguration， al-enough to effect administrative reform. 
location of the ministerial position has been regarded， inthe words 




(10) White， German Aid， pp.34-40 ; Schulz and Hansen， Aid or Impe旬
rialism， p.9; Development Assistance Committee (DAC) ， Ger-
旦豆ny，Policy Review Series， nO.9 (Paris : OECD， 1995)， p.15. 
(1) The ministerial position was granted to thβcoalition's minority 
partners， to出eFDP during the 1960s，出eCSU in the 1980 s 
and 90 s. The exception was the 1970s when the SPD was the 
ruling party. White， German Aid， p.34; Kornfeld-Ulmet，“West 
German Foreign Aid，" pp.48， 50; Intereconomics， September 
as“litle more than a piece of coalition juggling." (11) 
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the timing of the creation in the early 1960 s suggests that the BMZ 
In was subordinate to the Ministries of Finance and Economics. 
1961， the German government confronted a choice between inflation 
The Central Bank Council recom-and revaluation of the mark. 
mended export of capital to developing countries， rather than ad-
justing the discount rate， as a means of reconciling external equilib-
rium and domestic stability. 12) While the ]apanese bureaucracy has 
found a center of gravity in managing economic vulnerability， its 
German counterpart has developed export promotion as a shared 
national goal that can override different policy turfs. 
The Foreign Office， the Ministry of Finance， and the Ministry 
of Economics exercise strong influence on policy formulation and 
They do implementation and the allocation of budgetary resources. 
so through inter-ministerial committees that restrain the power of 
For the the BMZ in most areas of development cooperation policy町
first three years after the establishment of the BMZ in 1961， each of 
In 1964， these ministries had veto power over al BMZ decisions. 
the federal cabinet reviewed the ministry's jurisdiction and appor-
tioned the responsibilities for development issues among the minis-
tries. The Foreign Office was to have final authority in deciding al 
political questions connected with development aid ; both the Minis-
1970， p.273; Burghard Claus and Hans H. Lembke，“Doitsu no 
Kaihatsu Kyoryoku Seisaku [Development Policy in Ger-
manyJ ，" in Ippei Yamazawa and Mitsuru Hirata，吋5.，担出盟主
主担豆主主Yoroppano Kaihatsu Kyoryoku Seisakt1 [Develop-
ment Policy in ]apan， America， and EuropeJ (Tokyo: Ajia 
Keizai Kenky吋0，1992)， p.235. 
(12) Kreile，“1へTestGermany，" pp.213-15. 
???〈
?
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try of Economics and the Foreign Office were to be consulted and 
involved both in creating general principles and programs and in 
coordinating specific projects; ultimate responsibility for planning 
and implementing individual capital-aid projects was to be left to 
the Ministry of Economics， which was to seek advise from other 
agencies when necessary. The BMZ retained the last word in over-
al policy making but held sole responsibility in the field of techni-
The BMZ also lost al influence over military assis噌cal assistance. 
tance， which has been dominated by the Ministry of Defense， the 
These principles of Ministry of Interior and the Foreign office. (131 
jurisdiction were accepted by the Grand Coalition (CDU/CSU-SPD) 
in later years. 1l4J 
1n Germany， a remarkably wide range of development issues 
are covered by inter-ministerial committees through which various 
These ministries and interested societal actors exert influence. 
???
? ?
inter-ministerial committees have worked as“parapublic institu噂
(13) Hofmeir and SchuJtz，“German Aid，" p.231. 
(14) Holbik and Myers， West German Foreign Aid， pp.128句29;Jur-
gen Dennert， Entwicklungshilfe geplant oder verwaltet? : Entste-
hung und Konzeption des Bundesministeriums fur wi rtschaftli -
che Zusammenarbeit (Bielefeld: Bertelsmann Universitaetver・
lag， 1968)， pp.49-77; White， German Aid， p.36. BMZ's weakness 
was revealed in the debt crisis. Germany needed the United 
Kingdom's back up to convince the German Ministry of Fi-
nance of the n配 essarylevel of funds for international debt re-
lief. Barbara B. Crane，“Policy Coordination by Major West-
ern Powers in Bargaining with the Third W or1d: Debt Relief 
and the Common Fund，"担担旦百旦邑旦堕型住坐!2!!， 39，3 (Sum-
mer 1984)， 399目428.
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tions" that connect centralized societal organizations with decen-
tralized state organizations and serve as“both actors who partici-
pate and arenas that facilitate a stable accommodation of conflict-
ing objectives."OS) Between 1958 and 1960， before the creation of the 
BM2， three inter-ministerial committees were formed in an attempt 
to coordinate development aid. Later， such committees became in-
stitutionalized and expanded their influence over aid policy. The 
more important inter-ministerial committees include the Interminis-
terial Committees for Development Aid， for Educational and Social 
Aid， for Development Policy Research， for Public Relations， for De-
velopment Aid Statistics， for Coordination of Federal， Lander， and 
Communal Aid， for Coordinating Committee for Town Partnership 
Matters， and for Export Guarantees and Securities (the Hermes 
Committee). The Hermes committee， which approves export and 
investment insurance， consIsts of members from the Foreign Office， 
the Ministry of Finance， the Ministry of Economics， the BM2， and 
other related public and private groups such as the Bundesbank， 
KfW (a governmental export credit and official aid organization)， 
AKA (similar to KfW)， industry associations， banks， and export as剛
sociations. (16) In addition to inter-ministerial committees， there are 
also cabinet level councils such as the Advisory Council for Devel-
opment Aid Beirat舟rEn伽icklungstolitik，which was established in 
一 (15) Katzenstein， Policy and Politic in West Germany， p.80. 
(16) Kornfeld-Umlet，“West German Foreign Aid，" p.46; Schulz 
and Hansen， Aid or Imperialism， p.lO; Hichert， Staatliche Ex-
portabsicherung， pp.196-97. Decisions on insurance coverage 
for small and medium sized companies are made only by the 
Ministries of Economics and Finance. 
??
10 
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1963 and reorganized in 1970 as the German Forum for Develop-
ment Policy DeuおchesForum )加 Entwicklungspolit必 underthe 
chairmanship of the Federal President. (]7) 
Decentralization is increased by the BMZ's heavy reliance on 
staff loaned frOrri other ministries and related organizations. As is 
usual for relatively new ministries， the BMZ has had to borrow ofi-
cials on a secondment basis from other ministries， churches， univer悶
sities， and development NGOs， inorder to fil staff positions. AI-
though detailed personnel data is not available， as of the early 1990 
s at least 300 specialists， out of a total of 680 BMZ employees， were 
on loan. (18) Decentralization is a1so enhanced by distribution of 
staff over more than 60 sections， resulting in fewer than 10 employ-
ees in most sections. Overseas， the B九1Zhas had to station its rep-
resentatives， on a temporary basis， in German embassies， interna-
tional organizatiol1s， and overseas offices of governmental imp1e句
menting agencies， which are a1 under the jurisdiction of other min.白
istries. For example， German embassies in developing countries 
have over 200 diplomatic staff working in the area of development， 
but only 25 are seconded from the BMZ. (19) 
Reflecting the ministeriallevel decentralization， no governmen-
(17) Shaw，“West German Development Aid，" pp.95-97. 
(18) The number of staff is from Claus and Lembke，“Doitsu，" p.266. 
1n this line， the German BMZ resemb1es the ]apanese Prime 
Minister's Office. 
(19) Arnold， 1mplementing Deve10ping Assistance， pp.44; Y oshio 
Maruya，“Nishi Y oroppa Shokoku no tai Raten Amerika 
Keizai Seisaku 0 Meguru Shomondai，" in Maruya， ed.， Obei 
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tal agency that implements German development cooperation policy 
Even semi-is under the control of a single， dominant ministry. 
governmental organizations involved in technical cooperation， over 
which the BMZ is supposed to exert larger influence， are jointly ad-
ministered by various federal ministries， state governments， and 
business organizations. (20) Implementation of technical cooperation 
Shomondai [The United States and European Assistance Poli-
cies toward Latin America] (Tokyo : Ajia Keizai Kenkyujo， 
1989)， pp.84-85; Kornfeld-Umlet，“West German Foreign Aid，" 
p.63;DAC， Q豆竪担l，pp.17 and 21; Kokusai Kyoryoku Jigyo-
dan (JICA) and Kokusai Kyoryoku Sogo Kenshujo，“Senshink-
oku Enjo Kikan， Kokusai Kikan ni okeru Kaihatsu Chosa Jisshi 
Hoho ni kansuru Chosa Hokokusho，" February 1987， p.4l. 
(20) These technical cooperation organizations were established in 
the early 1960s after creation of the BMZ. They are so many 
that it is impossible to comprehend which organization is re-
sponsible for what: Deutsche Geselk守chajtjur Technische Zusam-
menarbeit (GTZ， the governmental technical coopenition or嗣
ganization， as a result of merger between Deutsche Forderungs-
gesellschajt jur Ent仰 :cklungslander[GA WI] and Bundesstelle jur 
Entwicklungshi俳 [BfE]in 1974)， Deutschcer Entwicklungsdienst 
(DED， German volunteers service)， Deutsche St折mgjur Interna-
tionale Entwicklung (DSE， training of developing countries' 
technicians and information service)， DeuおchesInstitut jur 
Entwicklungs_ρolitik (DIE， post-graduate education research 
andconsultant)， Carl-Duisburg Gesellscha.β(CDG， training for 
foreigners)， Bundesamt jur Gewerbliche Wirおchaft(BAW， coop-
eration with GA WI)， Zentralstelle j加 Arbeitsvermittlung(ZA V， 
placement of foreign trainees)， the Otto-Benecke-Foundation 
(OBS， university and vocational training courses for refugees)， 
the Federal Agency for Foreign Trade and Information (infor-
mation service)， the Goeth Institute (language training)， Deut-
scher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD， exchange of stu-
dents)， the German Voluntary Service (GVS， sending young spe-
cialists to developing countries); Arbeit，駅 meinschaft jur 
???
? ?
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has to pass multiple checks set both by these organizations and by 
For example， technical training programs usu・federal ministries. 
ally begin as plans made by the Foreign Office， which is in charge 
of cultural and language programs， and the BMZ， which provides 
A draft plan is then submitted to an inter-ministerial com-funds. 
mittee of the Foreign Ministry， the BMZ and state governments. 
Once a proposal has been approved by the committee， the BMZ 
and the participating state government execute the project with 
technical help from the Federal Ministry of Labor， the CDG， the 
DSE， the Central Labor Exchange， the Office for Unemployment 1n-
surance and the Goethe 1nstitute， iflanguage training is necessary. (21) 
Project evaluation is also decentralized， even though there is an 
evaluation unit within the BMZ， and involves the related ministries， 
governmental implementation institutions， and even political foun-
dations. (22) 
Foreign aid loans provided by KfW follow a similar procedure. 
???
? ?
The 1nter脚ministerialCommittee for Capital Aid exercises discre喝
Ent飢えcklungshilfe(AGEH]い Christliche Fachkrafte Internαtioηαl 
(CFI); Dienste in Ubersee (Dむ). For a concise description of 
German technical cooperation， see DAC，白血担y，pp.40-41. 
(21) For details of procedures and operations being carried out by 
these semi-governmental organizations， see Shaw，“West Ger-
man Development Aid，" pp.100岨125;White， German Aid， pp.175 
‘179; Erhard Eppler，“Chance and Obligation for Germany，" 1n-
tereconomics， September 1969， pp.276-80. 
(22) Stefan A. Musto，“Evaluation Policy Performance in the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany，" in Olav Stokke， ed.， Ev豆旦白星De-
翌lopmentAssistance: Policies and Performance (London: 
Frank Cass， 1991)， pp.127-148. 
Corporatism and Development Cooperation Policy in Germany (Kato) 
tionary power at various stages of the process. Compared to Japan， 
state authority over foreign aid has been remarkably diffused 
through institutional arrangements. (ぬ
Where Japan depends on a smaII number of highly mobile gen-
eralists to implement policy， German development policy relies on a 
large number of extra-governmental experts in development issues. 
For example， about 2，000 development consultants work along with 
800 headquarter staff of the KfW (roughly 40 percent of whom are 
engaged in development cooperation). In the GTZ more than 6，000 
project-staff， including overseas staff， development consultants and 
experts in local economies， supplel11ent the headquarter咽、 staffof 
1，30∞o. (位凶削2到叩4心I To edL白uc印at白ethese developl11ent expe町rtおs，the Fe 【de臼ra叫lgov-
e訂rnτ百nme釘ntestab!ished the Developmen凶1札tInstitute (DIE) in 1964， which 
offers a one-year course for postgraduates.(251 Thus， the German 
(23) Klaus Bodel11er，血性主主)皿g生自主二色盟主主rw目立旦田恒臣室
盟立王笠自民区亘xisder deutschen Entwicklu盟由主ein d主主E
Sten Dekade (Munchen: Weltforul11 Verlag， 1974)， p.374; Asso-
ciation for Promotion of International Cooperation， A Guide to 
h型空室ODA(Tokyo: APIC， 1989)， p.87. 
(24) Claus and Lel11bke，“Doitsu，" pp.271・279;Manfred Glagow， Ro-
land Hartmann， Ulrike Menne， Renate Pollvogt， Uwe Schi-
mank， Die deutschen Entwicklungsbanken: Zur Organisation 
und Tatigkeit der Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau (KfW) und 
der Deutschen Fin迎豆笠型鐙陸型llschaftfur B型型型空ιeni旦
Entwicklungslandern (DEG) (Saarbrucken， Germany: Breiten噌
=. bach， 1989)， p.1l5. 
七 (25)Similar educational institutions for development experts， such 
as the Foundation for Advanced Studies on International Devel-
14 opment (F ACID) and the Advanced Developl11ent School within 
the Institute of Developing Econol11ies， emerged in J apan in the 
early 1990 s， three decades after their German counterparts. 
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state is in fact as decentralized as the Japanese state， maybe more 
so， and decentralization can allow dramatic change or stif1e it， so 
we need to look at the role of societal actors in this particular sort 
of decentralization to understand Germany's policy continuity. 
While the German state is decentralized， German societal ac-
tors are organized into centralized peak institutions at the federal 
level. Labor， business， churches， political parties， and other non-
governmental organizations are able to insert their political inter-
ests and values into policy through institutionally嗣guaranteed，
strong participation in the making of German development coopera-
tion policy. 
Societal actors participating in German development coopera-
tion policy can be roughly grouped into two: value目orientedgroups 
such as churches， political foundations， and other voluntary NGOs 
on the one hand， and groups motivated by economic interests such 
as labor ul1ions and business associations 011 the other. Both groups 
have a common willingness to take advantage of political opportu伺
nities to participate in state policy-making and incorporate their de-
velopment values and economic interests into political outcomes. 
The value-oriel1ted groups seek to realize the “international social 
market economy，" in which assistance must be designed to promote 
self-help in communities within developing countries and realize the 
peoples' independence both politically and economically. This no・
tion of self-help developed in successive social movements during 
the 1960s， when many self-help organizations such as rehabilitation 
groups， handicapped groups and senior citizens groups were estab-
七
15 
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While Japan sees self-help as RostownIan macro-economic lished. 
take-off， the Germans goal is to help communities provide “non-
commodified goods and services" for themselves. (26) 
Economic interest groups， on the other hand， tend to emphasize 
protection and enhancement of their economic interests， but， like 
the value-NGOs， they rely on the ideology of the social market 
Business associations and labor organizations argue that econo立ly.
the impact of interdependence with developing countries on German 
Thus， by exports and employment poses a threat to social justice. 
their logic， economic losses resulting from competition with indus-
tries in developing countries must be compensated for by the state. 
Therefore， for German business and labor， development cooperation 
policy should be nothing less than aid policy for the domestic vic-
In the following， 1 will examine institutional arrange司tims of trade. 
ments that guarantee social actors， both value-oriented NGOs and 
economically motivated business and labor， a role in policy-making 
and implementation. 
Political Foundations (2) 
German political foundations and churches are among the most 
The political foun-
(26) Jost Halfmann，“Social Change and Political Mobilization in 
West Germany，" in Katzenstein， ed.， 1ndustry and Politics in 
West Germany， p.75. The definition of self-help was originally 
cited from Peter Gross，“Der W ohlfahrtsstaat und die Bedeu-
tung der Selbsthilfe-Bewegung，" Soziale Welt 33 (1982)， 28. 
(2ηAbout 70 German NGOs that belong neither to party founda-
tions nor churches are centralized around the Central Agency 
centralized of German value-oriented NGOs.m) 
???
? ?
The Tsukuba University Journal of low and Politics No.25.1998 
dations have been involved in state policy.making through the po・
litical parties with which they are affiliated. All five major politi-
cal foundations are backed by political parti田:the Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung (FES) by the Social Democratic party (SPD); the Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) by the conservative Christian Democratic 
Union (CDU); the Friedrich Nauman Stiftung (FNS) by the liberal 
Free Democratic Party (FDP); the Hanns-Seidel Stiftung (HSS) by 
the right-wing Christian Social Union (CSU); and the Rainbow 
Foundation by the Green Party.(281 Although these foundations 
claim to be independent of the political parties， major party mem-
bers are directors and truste邸 ofthe foundations， showing a close 
linkage between foundation and party. The Green Party may be an 
exception. In line with party philosophy， the Greens have opted to 
support a wide range of decentralized NGOs that are committed to 
environmental and social change. (却1One detaHed study of the po・
litical foundations explained that : 
[as of 1984] Over two-thirds of the directors and one-
fifth of the trustees of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung， for 
example， are SPD politicians. They include three cur-
rent or former Lander prime ministers， the party gen・
for International Development， which was established under the 
initiative of出eBMZ.
(28) Only the FES was created before the war. The founding years 
of these political foundations are as follows:出eFES in 1925， 
the FNS in 1958， the KAS in 1958， the HSS in 1967， and the 
Rainbow Foundation in 1986. Friedhelm Mensing， Grassroots 
Help for the Grassroots: German Non-Governmental Organiza-
tions Assist around the World (Bonn: Inter Nations， 1994)， p.9. 
(29) Schulz，“Development Aid and Trade，" p.253. 
七。
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eral secretary， the current leader of the SPD， Hans-
J ochen V ogel and Willy Brandt. The board of tr凶 tees
also includes leading trade unionists and directors of 
companies such as Daimler Benz， Henkel and Horten. 
ln the case of the Konrad Adenaller Stiftung， 80% of 
the board of directors are leading CDU politicians in-
cluding Chancellor Kohl. lt has no board of trustees 
but of its 40 members 85% are CDU politicians includ-
ing four Federal ministers and a prime minister of a 
provincial state. Similarly 77% of the board of direc-
tors of the Hanns-Seidel Stiftung is composed of CSU 
politicians including Franz-J osef Strauss. Siegfried 
Lengl， who was chief executive officer of the HSS for 
9 years lntil Octob吃r1982， isnow Secretary of State in 
the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation. The 
HSS has no board of trustees but， of its 25 members， 
60% are CSU politicians. The Freidrich Naumann 
Stiftung is equally c10sely linked to its political party 
although the pattern is rather different: the main po・
litical heavyweights (such as former President WaIter 
Scheel andevelopment cooperationount Lambsdorf) 
are on the board of trustees， 54 % of whose members 
are FDP politicians; the board of directors， of which 
Ralf Dahrendorf is chairman， includes only lesser 
known FDP politicians." I初
Strong connections with major politicaI parti出 haveenabled 
the German foundations to extract substantial financial support 
from the BMZ. For example， while ordinary German NGOs have to 
三 raise25 percent of total project costs by themselves， the political 
/、
九 (30)Veronica Forrester，“The German Political Foundations，" in 
I8 Stevens and van Themaat， eds.， fressure Groups， Policies and 
空包d盟虫旦!， p.43. 
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foundations have been able to receive ful support from the ministry 
for their projects. This is a political decision taken by the parlia-
ment， on the grounds出atthe political foundations are independent 
and have no source of income other than federal support. In this 
line， even the administrative costs of managing the foundation-
s'headquarters in Bonn have been covered by the ministry， an ex-
ceptional benefit allowed only for political foundations. All of 
these grants have been counted as German ODA and have been re-
ported to the OECD. In 1992， DM 360 million was disbursed for pro-
jects carried out by the 5 political organizations. (31) 
The financial support from the BMZ for German foundations is 
awarded on a fixed ratio of 2(FES): 2(KAS) : l(FNS) : l(HSS) in 
cases of socio・politicaland education projects， and 3 : 3 : 2 : 2 forso・
cial projects.悶 Achange of governing parties， hence， offers litle 
opportunity for the new government to make decisive changes in 
development cooperation policy. Coalitional change have caused 
shifts in emphasis， as was the case when the SPD government fo・
cused on humanitarian aid， incontrast to the CDU/CSU's empha-
sis on effects on the German economy. But even then， the SPD's 
Minister for Economic Cooperation in 1969， Hans-Jurgen Wischnew-
ski， identified himself from the onset of his ministerial duties with 
the work of his FDP predecessor， Walter Scheel : 
(31) Forrester，“The German Political Foundations，" p.45; Organi-
zation for Economic Co-operation and Development， Aid Re-
view 1993/94: Memorandum of Germany， unpublished paper， 
1 February 1994， p.27. 
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Let me say， first of al， that since 1 already cooperated 
indirectly on the parliamentary level in making the 
blueprints for German development-aid policy， no basi-
cally new direction will be taken in German development-
aid policy， although now in the administration we are 
in the process of conducting an inventory， inorder to 
consider what can possibly be improved. (33) 
This broad consensus among political parties tends to be for-
mulated out of the public eye， and， as a result， legislative action is 
less and less important in the discussion of development issues. (34) 
Karl-Heiz Sohn， Parliamentary Secretary of State in the BMZ， an-
swered a journalist's questions by saying that“both the aim and the 
scope of our development policy have never been a bone of conten-
tion fundamentally between the Government and opposition parties."問
As a matter of fact， few questions about the activities of the Ger-
man foundations were raised in parliament. During 1976-80， two 
questions were raised， 1980-83， three questions， 1983‘84， six ques-
tions. (30) The parliamentary Development Aid Committee (Der 
Bund鈴ぬg時間schussfuγWlγtschaftlische Z協 αmmenarbeit，A WZ) com-
posed of 25 members from major political parties， has generally 
served as a rubber stamp not only for budget allocations， which are 
under the controI of the Budget Committee， but for the master plan 
for development policy， which is not usually made public. m) Only 
??(33) Claus and Lembke，“Doitsu，" p.244. Quotation is from Holbik 
and Myers、主位tGermanForeign Aid， p.130. 
(34) Claus and Lembke，“Doitsu，" p.246. 
(35) Intereconomics， September 1970， p.274. 
(36) Forrester，“The German Political Foundation，" p.55. 
(37) Kornfeld-Ulmet，“West German Foreign Aid，" pp.85噂86.
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the Greens have made even occasional open attacks in the 
Bundestag on BMZ policies such as the mixed financing policy出at
combines aid and export credits. While a “watch" group to monitor 
parliament， called the Bundeskongress Entwicklung:司politischerAk-
tio悦~gruppen (Buko)， acts as a focal point for 200 action groups in 
Germany，側itsinfluence has been marginal. 
The German political foundations have emphasized education 
and training， because， domestically， the German Basic Law assigned 
the political parties the mission of providing political education to 
the Germans. When a 1966 court decision suspended the provision 
of federal funds for political parties'educational activities， the foun-
dations took over the educational role. Based upon this court deci-
sion， the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1966 began to provide finan-
cial support to the political foundations for educational activities 
that promote democracy in Germany.側 TheMinistry of Economic 
Cooperation followed suit and decided to extend financial support 
to the political foundations for the purpose of promoting democracy 
in developing countries. For example， during the 1980s， about 70 to 
80 percent of government funds disbursed to the four major German 
foundations was used for political education， technical training， and 
social research出ataimed at promoting democracy and self-help in 
(38) The Buko launched th陀 emajor national campaigns in the 1980s， 
challenging the marketing strategy of出epharmac四 ticalin-
dustry， the role of German agribusiness corporations， and the 
export of mi1tary eq川ipment.OECD， Voluntary Aid， p.1l8. 
(39) Katzenstein， Policy and Politics in West Germany， pp.380-81; 
Forrester，“The German Political Foundations，" p.44. 
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local communities. Because， political education to strengthen de-
mocracy has often caused conflict with authoritarian governments 
in developing countries， German foundations tend to be highly se-
cretive about their activities.印刷
The government's“watering噂can"discipline， which is intended 
to avert regional bias in the dislribution of official aid (see Chapter 
Two)， reflects the international political and economic goals of the 
foundations. The regional preferences of one foundation， such as 
KAS's concentration of about 50 percent of government grants in 
Christian Latin America， are balanced by the different focus of an-
other， such as the HSS's direction of about 40 percent of its funds to 
Africa. As a result， government grants provided through the politi-
cal foundations， and the regional staffs of the foundations， tend to 
be distributed with about 30 percent going to Africa， 30 percent 
Asia， 30percent Latin America， and 10 percent Europe. 
The regional biases of the political foundations have been 
shrinking as their international networks have expanded. For ex-
ample， following the FES's cooperation with the Socialist Interna-
tional， which e!ected German Chancellor Willy Brandt Chairman in 
1976， and the KAS's link with two Christian Democratic 1nterna-
tionals， the International Christian Democrats based in Rome and 
一
(40) Forrester，“The German Political Foundations，" pp.40 and 50; 
Michael Pinto-Duschinsky，“Foreign Political Aid: The Ger-
man Political Foundations and Their US Counterparts，" Inter-
national Affairs 67， 1 (J anuary 1991)， 38・39. 1n ]apan's eco-
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the International Democratic Union based in London， the develop-
ment activities of both organizations became global， irrespective of 
German economic interests or bilateral relations. (州
(3) Churches 
German churches， both Catholic and Protestant， have also sup-
ported highly centralized， value-oriented NGOs. As Chancellor Hel-
mut Kohl congratulated his nation，“There are few other countries 
where the public--both as tax-payers and as donors through， say， the 
churches--do so much for the people of the Third W orld." ln the 
same context， the Chancellor also noted that“Development aid is 
not the responsibility of the government alone but of society as a 
whole... Let me say a special word of thanks to the churches， which 
have helped to create a high degree of sensitivity in our country to 
distress in the Third Worid."(<2) Like the political foundations， Ger-
man church NGOs are centralized around peak NGOs at the federal 
level. Those peak associations are Misereor for Catholic churches 
and Brot jur die v分lt(Bread for the W orld) for Protestant 
Churches. Just as they have had a decisive influence on social pol-
icy within Germany， churches have determined a basic direction of 
(41) Forrester，“The German Political Foundation，" pp.48-49， 52， and 
56; Holbik and Myers， West German Foreign Aid， pp.105-106; 
Maruya，“Nishi Yoroppa，" pp.38-39; Pinto-Duschinsky，“For句
eign Political Aid，" 37 
(42)皇旦巨旦ents& Speeches， July 18， 1986， p.8， and March 23， 1987， 
p.13. About the importance of German churches in public life， 
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the Federal Republic's humanitarian aid policy. 
While churches' social activities within Germany have been 
largely funded through transfers of public resources such as a 
“church tax" (equivalent to 5 percent of the income tax) and social 
insurance funds， church NGO activities in developing countries have 
used both donations from German citizens and financial support 
from the BMZ， but donations from ordinary citizens have provided 
a major part of church expenditures in developing countries. Pri-
vate donations make German society one of the most generous in 
the OECD困 Privategrants by German NGOs to developing coun-
tries amounted to about $550 million， one sixth of the total DAC 
private grants in the mid-1980 s. Even measured as a percentage of 
GNP， German private grants have exceeded those made by ]apa-
nese NGOs by a factor of between five and seven since the 1970 s. 
In 1990， Germans contributed an average of $12 per capita to pri. 
vate grants extended by German NGOs， while the ]apanese gave 
$0.8 through NGOS.14:l) The BMZ injects substantial additional capi圃
(43) Germany's ratio of private grants to GNP was 0.05 in 1975， 0.05 
in 1980， and 0.07 in 1985， while ]apan's ratio has been between 
.0 and .01 during the same period. OECD， V oluntary Aid， 
PP.147-48 and 152; OECD， Directory of Non.Governmental En. 
vironment and Development 0旦担izationsin OECD Countries 
(OECD: Paris， 1992)， p.44. According to the German Central 
Institute foτSocial Questions DeuL'iches Zentγαlinstitut弗rsoziale 
Fragen， the Germans donated about DM 4.1 billion ($2.4 billion) 
to charitable causes in 1992， almost five times German dona-
tions to developing countries. This Week in Germany， January 
7， 1994， p.5. 
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tal by subcontracting implementation of humanitarian aid to Ger-
man churches. Federal assistance to the church NGOs increased 
from DM 50 million in the 1960 s to DM 210 million in 1985 (almost 
equal to the assistance given to the political foundations， DM 225 
million)， and to DM 294 million in 1992. On a cumulative basis from 
1962 to 1985， the federal government paid church NGOs DM 2.5 bil-
lion， surpassing the DM 2.1 billion given to the political. foun-
dations. (44) 
In order to disburse these funds， both the Catholic and Protes-
tant churches have founded special organizations--the German 
Catholic Bishops' Organization for Development Cooperation (KZE) 
and the German Protestant Association for Cooperation in Develop-
ment Evangelische Zentralstelle 舟rEntwicklungshilfe， EZE). In 1981， 
through these organizations， 66 Catholic and 42 Protestant institu-
tions contributed DM 340 million and DM 290 million respectively 
to developing countries.附 Thefinancial effort is supported by am-
ple human resources. Major church NGOs， like the political foun-
dations， can afford to hire staffs of more than 100， an astonishing 
number when compared to the fewer than 20 employees of the al-
leged ]apanese umbrella NGO in Tokyo， ]ANIC. (46) Education， 
(4) Schulz，“Development Aid and Trade，" p.255; Katzenstein， Pol-
icy and Politics in West Germany， p.76; Mensing，生虫笠旦E
Help， p.5. 
(45) The Development Center， OECD， Ihe Role of Non-Govern-
mental Organizations in Dc， New Series， NO.10 (OECD: Paris， 
1983)， p.53. 
(46) Kokusai Kyoryoku Suishin Kyokai (APIC)， Shuyo Senshinkoku 
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health， and agricultural development have been the foci of these 
funds. For example， inthe agricultural field， 26organizations， in-
cluding the church organizations， founded TransFair Association， 
which has succeeded in having more than 17，000 German supermar-
kets stock coffee which pays small farmers in Latin America and 
Africa almost twice as much as the market price. In education， the 
Personnel Agency of the German Catholics for International Coop-
eration (AGEH) in Cologne and the Protestant Services Overseas 
(DU) use specialists who have returned from developing countries to 
provide educational services to traine田 fromdeveloping countries. (47) 
Despite the substantial support出eyreceive from the govern-
ment， the church NGOs have maintained a“complementary" mu-
tual independence with the government， incontrast to the supple-
mentary status of Japanese NGOs. (拍) Project implementation by 
German church圃relatedNGOs has not been strictly supervised， and 
出eyare required to submit budget reports only after projects have 
been accomplished. 
Two special sections within the Third Bureau of the BMZ deal 
with German foundations and churches and convene meetings with 
NGOs in Major Industrialized Countries} (Tokyo: APIC， 1991)， 
p.89. Int疋rview，No.8， Tokyo， June 17， 1993. 
(47) Schulz，“Development Aid and Trade，" p.252; Mensing， Grass-
日昼sHelp， pp.6-7. 
(48) Interviews， Nos.32， 33 and 34， Bonn， June 20， 1994; Yayori 
Matsui and Ronald Luprecht， eds.， NGO， ODA Enjo wa Dareno 
Tameka: Nihon to Doitsu to Daisan Sekai [NGO and ODA 
Aid For Whom?: Japan， Germany， and the Third WorldJ (To・
kyo: Akashi Shoten， 1992)， pp.96-109. 
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their respective NGOs on a regular basis. About 30 officials in 
these sections work to arrange co-financed programs to be imple-
mented in cooperation with more than 600 German NGOs.(掛 These
institutional arrangements facilitate participation by the NGOs in 
policy. For example， the joint conference of German churches on 
development issues can usually submit memoranda to the govern-
ment before international meetings such as the UNCT AD. And 
they have done so， especially regarding human right issues. Also， 
the German Protestant Churches directed federaI humanitarian aid 
toward national liberation movements in Africa.刷
Political foundations and church-related NGOs constitute a mi-
nority among German development NGOs. There are more than 
2，000 NGOs of various sizes and memberships concerned with devel-
opment cooperation， while only 150 NGOs are financialIy supported 
by the federal government. Among those supported are Deutsche 
Welth仰~gerhilfe (DWHH)， Terre des Hommes， Wellj干iedensdienst，
Bensheimer Kries. 1n the early 1990 s， al German NGOs together 
collected roughly $800 million in private contributions， almost twice 
(49) Maruya，“Nishi Yoroppa，" p.85; Kokusai Kyoryoku Suishin 
Kyokai， Shuyo Senshinkoku， p.85; Clause and Lembke， 
“Doitsu，" p.247; OECD， Voluntary Aid， p.80; and KnuseI， West 
German Aid， p.88. 
(50) Gerhard Grohs，“The Churches and Human Rights，" in Rainer 
Tetzlaff， ed.， Human Rights and Development: German and 1n時
ternational Comments and Documents (Stuttgart: Eine Welt， 
1993)， pp.151-60; Manfred Nitsch，“Rich Country Interests and 
Third World Development: The Federal Republic of Ger-
many，" in Cassen Jolly and Wood， eds.， Rich Country Interests 
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the amount of federal support. In 1990， some 90 organizations 
which have no links with either the churches or the political parties 
received DM 43 million from the federal govemment.(51) These Ger-
man citIzen NGOs are embedded not only in Germany but also in 
Europe. Intra-regional cooperation in Europe among citizen NGOs 
is strongly institutionalized. There exists a Code of Conduct for 
European N GOs， and about 50 German N GOs are part of an EC-
NGO Liaison Committee. (52) 
(4) 5tates and communities 
German states Lander and municipal communities Gemeinden 
are also deeply involved in development cooperation policy-making 
and implementation. Their participation has been institutionalized 
through centralized inter-state organizations that coordinate state 
and community development programs with those of the federal 
govemment. Like German NGOs， the local govemments are highly 
influenced by humanitarian values. As party foundations have fo-
cused on political education in developing countries because politi-
cal education is their responsibility within Germany， local govem-
ments emphasize academic and cultural education because educa-
tion in general is their responsibility. More than half of the 85，000 
foreign students studying at German universities are from develop-
(51) Development Center， OECD， The Role of Non-Governmental 
Organizations， p.53; OECD，“Aid Review: Memorandum of 
Germany，" 1 February 1994， p.27; DAC， Germ担y_， pp.23・24'.
(52) Interview， No.33， Bonn， June 20， 1994; UNESCO， G:uide to the 
Information Activities of European Development Networks 
(Paris， UNESCO， 1991); p.13; DAC， Q笠虫盟主， p.23. 
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ing countries. (53) In 1985， more than 2，000 scholarships were awarded 
by states to students from developing countries to study in Germany. 
The cumulative foreign aid， except scholarships， provided by the 
states from 1962 to 1991 amounted to almost DM 2 billion， and in 
1991 alone it was DM 140 million ($93 million). In contrast， in1993， 
]apanese ODA provided by local governments was roughly Y 1，00 
million ($11 million). (54) 
Educational aid extended by the stat田 iscoordinated by an 
inter-governmental and inter-ministerial special commission， called 
the State Commission for Development Aid Landerkomm前五'onfur 
Entwicklungshilfe， established in Stuttgart in 1962 to assure the best 
use of the modest r田ourcesGerman stat田 haveavailable for devel-
oping countries. (55) 
Similarly， community-level economic cooperation with develop-
ing countri回 hasbeen centralized around the Secretariat for Com-
munal Partnership with Communities in Developing Countries Sekre-
tα:riat弗rKommu:加 leP，αγtηersc加iftenmit Gemeind，側悦Entwicklu:時・
(53) The number of foreign students in Germany far exceeds than 
出atin ]apan， about 50，000 in 1993. 
(54) Rud-Schloz， The Federal Republic of Germany， p.86; BMZ， 
Druchsache 12/4096， Taelle 19; Claus and Lembke，“Doitsu，" 
p.240; MOF A， Japan's ODA， 1994， p.230; Nihon Keizai Shim-
bun， March 5， 1994， p.23. 
(5) Holbik and Myers， West German Foreign Aid， p.61; Shaw， 
“West German Development Aid，" p.134. In addition to educa-
tional cooperation， the state governments were granted by the 
federal government authorization to permit supplier export 
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slandern， which was established by the German Community Council 
Deutscher Gemeindetag in cooperation with the Federal Foreign Of-
fice and the BMZ. (56) 
(5) Labor Unions 
German labor and business interests in the field of development 
cooperation have also centralized representation in federal level la司
bor unions and business associations. German labor unions have 
advocated the use of development cooperation to delay structural 
adjustment， while seeking compensation from the German govern-
Iτlent for the loss of both domestic and overseas markets for Ger-
man products. While labor unions did establish a centralized or-
ganization to seek the betterment of working conditions in develop-
ing countri田， called Wir Helfen (We Help)， such value-oriented ac・
tivities have been secondary to labor's economic interests. For ex・
ample， the textile and clothing trade union once proposed a“recy-
cling" plan， in which the German government would levy high tar-
ifs as a“social duty" on textile and garment imports from develop-
ing countries and transfer the collected tariffs back to developing 
countries in order to develop economic and social infrastructure. (5;) 
This protectionist attitude derives from the German economy's 
international position. Put simply， Germany is unused to competi-
(56) Shaw，“West German Development Aid，" pp.135-136. 
(5ηWerner Olle，“Trade Union Policy in the Textile and clothing 
Industry，" in Stevens and van Themaat eds.， Press川reGroups， 
Policies and Development， p.93 (original source of this informa-
tion was BMZ， Die Quelle， no.2/80). 
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tion from developing economies， which has been increasing rapidly， 
even in Europe， since the 1970s. As a consequence， successful com-
petition from the South is largely to blame for the fact that employ-
ment in challenged sectors in Germany has declined faster出an，for 
example， inJapan. Imports of manufactured products from devel-
oping countries to Germany， as a percent of GDP during 1970・85，in-
creased about 1.2 percent， more than twice Japan's 0.5 percent. Dur-
ing the same period， the German manufacturing sector's share of 
employment declined 7 percent， while J apan's lost only 2 percent. (58) 
Although German employment associated with exports to develop-
ing countries has been declining steadily， severely damaged indus-
tri田 suchas textiles， shipbuilding and locomotives needed to take 
coIlective action to acquire compensation from the government for 
their loss田. Instead of forcing structural change， the government 
has no choice but to foIIow the ideology of the social market econ-
omy and make up the losses. Compensation to labor has taken the 
form of tied aid and mixed credits (ODA and export credits) as ex-
port subsidies. In 1984， while some 1 miIion workers， most of them 
in manufacturing， relied on exports to developing countries， German 
aid was estimated to employ 8，300 workers per biIion DM dis-
bursed to developing countries. In the late 1970s， German develop-
ment aid was said to protect some 30，000 jobs. In 1991， Germany 
provided DM 10 biIion in aid， saving roughly 80，000 jobs. Ship-
bui1ding has received the greatest subsidy from foreign aid. Five 
(58) Adrian W ood， North -South Trade， Employment and Inequal-
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percent of workers in the shipbuilding industry were dependent on 
German tied aid in the late 1980s， followed by 1 percent of mechani-
cal engineering workers. (59) In sum， German labor has succeeded not 
only in delaying structural adjustments but in acquiring compensa-
tion from the state by transforming development aid into protec-
tionist subsidies to domestic industries. 
(6) Business Associations 
German business's economic inter白tsin development have been 
systematically realized through peak associations at the federal 
level. This has been particularly conspicuous for small-and medium 
-sized (S&M) companies. In Germany， S&M multinational compa-
ni白 spreadal over Germany have dominated busine部 withdevel-
oping countries， while in Japan， big global corporations concen-
trated in Tokyo and Osaka have been the main vehicles of develop-
ment business. German S&M multinationals outnumbered their 
Japanese counterparts by a factor of two: 7，000 vs. 3，500， and Ger-
man S&M companies are independent suppliers Zuli，ψrer and gain 
high profits， while their J apanese counterparts are subordinated to 
parent companies as subcontractors Shitauke.C6f) 
一
(59) 1ntereconomic~， May /June 1981， p.124; May， et.al.， Q空空盟主
Aid， p.200・209，212. The depressed J apanese shipbuilding indus-
仕y. was also supported by ODA・financedorders. However， in-
stead of saving jobs， the orders had to be shared with the 
United States in order to reduce出etrade surplus. Arase， ~笠こ
担註盟匹 p.78.
(60) The Economis1， July 30出， 1994， p.58; The World Bank，主必d
Development Report 1991， p.4; Hiroichi Demizu， Nichi Doku 
??
? ? ?
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These German multinationals long ago succeeded in incorporat-
ing themselves into policy implementation， especially the process re・
lated to aid finance. As we saw in Chapter Two， this deep involve-
ment has enabled German business to turn nominally untied Ger-
man ODA into effectively tied aid. Generally， three-quarters of 0子
ders channeled through the GTZ， the Agency for Technical Coop-
eration， are given to Germany S&M companies. Also more than 80 
percent of DEG (the German Development Company) business has 
been given to S&M companies. The German aid process， like the 
]apanese， starts with an official requ回tfrorn a developing country. 
Like the ]apanese trading firms， German S&M multinational 
firms identify suitable projects， conduct feasibiIty studies， and 
write draft proposals which are officially submitted by the local de幽
veloping countries to the Bonn government for financing. However， 
as an informed aid expert described it，“The formal request to the 
Federal Government for aid is often the last step in a long process 
of private negotiation over which the Federal Govemment itself has 
exercised litle control， and the contract is more or les promised 
before the granting of aid has been officially approved." (61) While 
the federal government provides information about development 
projects and supply and service opportunities through the Federal 
Institute for Foreign Trade Information Bundesanstalt fur 
Auenhandelsinjormation-BfAI)， and the BfAI publishes a daily 
“Nachrichten j勧 Auenhandel"as well as a weekly “Mitteilungen fur 
keizai Hikakuron [Comparative Analysis of ]apanese and Ger-
man Econοmies] (Tokyひ:Yuhikaku， 1981)， pp.102・103.
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WeltωirおchaftlicheZusammenarbeit" in which prospective develop-
ment projects are listed， these procedures are nominal. 
What makes German S&M firms different from ]apanese trad-
ing firms is that the former exert political pr田surethrough a cen-
tralized business association that represents their economic inter-
ests_ Like German labor， the centralized organizations of the Ger-
man business community have played an essential role in coordinat-
ing the economic interests of the tremendous number of small-and 
medium-sized multinationals and negotiating with the federal gov-
ernment in order obtain financial terms favorable to development 
projects organized by German companies_ 
The most important peak association for German S&M firms 
in the development field is the Association for Development Aid Ar-
佐伯;gemeinschaftfur Entwicklungslander_ The umbrella organiza齢
tion， which maintains c10se information ties with overseas German 
chambers of commerce， negotiates over specific projects not only 
with the federal government but also with German embassies 10-
cated in developing countries. (62) The association also inc1udes the 
major peak associations of German business， inc1uding the Confed-
eration of German Industry (BDI)， the Federation of German Cham-
bers of Industry and Commerce (DIHT)， and Bundesverbank Deut-
schen Banker. Membership in the regional branches of出eDIHT 
is compulsory for German S&M companies， and DIHT played a 
major role in establishing a Trusteeship for Interzonal Trade Treu-
handstelle fur den Interzonenhandel in the 1950 s， and the president 
(62) White， German Aid， p.46. 
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of DIHT， Otto Wolff von Amerongen， was also a chairman of the 
Eastern Comrnittee (Ost，仰 schus). During the recession of 1973・74，
the DIHT influenced the Hermes interministerial committee's deci-
sion to change insurance guarantee conditions to prornote Gerrnan 
exports. Similarly， BDI also exerted political pressure on Federal 
ministries and the insurance committee as they shaped the Develop-
ment Tax Law in 1964. (6:3) 
Technical cooperation provided by the German business corn-
munity has been centralized by these peak associations. For exam-
ple， the Senior Expert Service， established in 1983， isoperated by a 
partnership of BDI， DIHT， the Carl Duisberg Sponsoring Group and 
the Central Association of Gerrnan Trades (ZDH). ln 1992， the 
BMZ provided DM 1.6 l11illion， which paid for haIf of its l11isions.(64) 
OveraII， one consequence of active participation by Gerl11an so-
cietal actors in developl11ent cooperation policy can be seen in its 
relatively high cost. The average ratio of Gerl11an ODA to GNP 
during 1965・89was 0.4 percent， compared to J apan's 0.26 percent州
Although the Gerl11an ratio is lower than that of the Scandinavian 
countries， itis relatively high al110ng large industrialized Counω 
tries. The cOl11parison of Germany and Japan demonstrates that 
(63) Shaw，“West German Developl11ent Aid，" pp.153-54; Kreil， 
“West Gerl11any，" p.208; Gerard Braunthal， The Federation of 
Ger目立ln也stryin Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Pr田s，
1965)， p.333; lnterview， No.31， Bonn， June 14， 1994. 
(64) OECD，“Aid Review: Memorandum of Gerl11any，" 1 February 
1994， pp.32-35. 
(65) Lurnsdaine， Moral Vision， p.133， Table 4.6. 
五
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without strong societal participation， Japan's foreign aid， though it 
now accounts for the largest share of world aid， does not impose 
As the SPD's political foundation once high costs on the economy 
articulated，“The N orth-South conflict is the social issue of the 20 
(emphasis in original)" (附th century. 
Risk-Transferring Financial System B. 
The German system has worked to transfer risk， with the gov・
ernment acting to insulate private business from the risks and un-
certainties associated with interdependence with developing coun-
tries. Just as it has used public funds to compensate German labor 
and industries for the costs of strudural adjustment， the govern-
ment， through the financial system， has provided a safety net for 
German multinationals. Because the banks， inspite of their reputa-
tion for universal banking， have kept financial transactions with de-
veloping countries at arms-length， German industries， especially 
small-and medium鳴sizedfirms， have had to rely on official cover-
Using national and state budgets as sources of fi-age of risks. 
nance， the federal government has extended cheap loans and credits 
Thus， the high risks to German multinationals on favorable terms. 
associated with developing countries are transferred to the govern-
ment with litle sharing of costs. 
? ? ?
(6) The Friedrich Ebert Foundation， North South， back page of the 
cover. 
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( 1) German 8anks 
Germany has the longest sustained tradition of strong industrial 
banking among industrialized countri田. The first German indus-
trial bank， the Darmstader， was established in 1852. The 1870 s saw 
the creation of the current three major German banks--the Deut-
sche， Commerz and Dresdner Banks. These banks developed as 
universal (commerce and industry) banks and have been heavily in-
volved in management. The economic power of German banks has 
its base in their legal right to own large shares of German industry 
and to exercise proxy votes for other shareholders in the supervi-
sory boards of German companies. While ]apanese banks are al-
lowed to own only a 5 percent equity share of any Japanese corpo・
ration， German banks are permitted directly to take unlimited eq-
uity positions in other compani田. 1t is often reported出at，since 
出e1970s， almost 60 percent of most German companies祉lareswere 
either owned by or deposited with banks.刷 Germanbanks are also 
free from the central bank of Germany， while Japanese bank lend-
ing is under the strict guidance of the Bank of ]apan. The role of 
the Bundesbank as regulator is secondary to its function as spok田・
(67) Andrew Cox，“State， Finance and Industry in Comparative Per-
spective，" in Andrew Cox， ed.， Stat疋， Finance and 1ndustry: A 
Comparative Analysis of Post-War Trend回inSix Advanced In-
dustrial Economies (New York: St. Martin's Press， 1986)， pp.27 
-30; Frank V ogl， German Business After the Economic Mir-
acle (N ew Y ork: Halsted Press， 1973)， pp.43・45;Kenneth Dy-
son，“The State， Banks and Industries: The West German 
Case，" in Cox， ed.， State Finance and Industry， pp.129・130;The 
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man for the German banks.(68) Spindler was correct in pointing out 
that:“German governments have hesitated to intervene directly to 
influence the behavior of German banks in specific transactions. . . 
The mechanism leaves banks ultimately free to make their own 
credit and portfolio decisions， in keeping with the liberal tradition 
that has long played a key role in German finance."州
However， the independence and initiative in industrial banking 
does not hold true for international banking， especially in develop-
ment finance. While J apanese banks have been compelled to share 
the risks of development cooperation， German banks， whose inter-
national business has focused on Europe， have seen economic trans-
actions with risky developing countries as a matter of choice. Gen-
erally speaking， they have chosen to emphasise security， asking 
first about assets and real estate， not about business plans or prod-
ucts， when making lending decision. Since the early 1980 s， espe-
cially since 1984 when foreign banks were allowed to establish Ger-
man subsidiaries， German industries have criticized their own banks 
for their inability to assess risks associated with international capi-
tal transactions and their failure to provide adequate banking serv-
ices for international business. German banks even hesitated to in-
vest in eastern Europe in the ear1y 1990 s， until the situation became 
stable.171J) The German share of the total value of assets of the 
一 (68) Dyson，“The State， Banks， and Industries，円 p.l24.
(69) Spindler， The Politics of International Credit， p.l16. 
(70) M. Donald Hancock， West Germay: The Politics of Demo‘ 
eratic Corporatism (Chatham， NJ: Chatham House Publishers， 
Inc. 1989)， p.139; and Clodwig Kapferer，“How to Extend Ger-
????
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world's top 25 banks has been dec1ining from 15 percent in 1974・77
to 4 percent in 1983・85. ln contrast， the share of ]apan's rapidly 
growing banks has risen from 21 percent to 48 percent. The Ger-
man banks' share of the international market has been shrinking， 
while their financial c10ut in Europe has grown， and they have be-
come increasingly prominent in their control of major leadership 
positions in stock and financial derivatives.(711 
ln general， German banks have felt that development finance 
without state guarantees is out of出equestion， and their networks 
in developing countries， incIuding subsidiaries， affiliates， and repre-
sentative offices， consisted of only 105 entities in 1985， while ]apa-
nese banks were responsible for 300.問 TheGerman banks have 
participated in development policy-making in order to extract subsi-
dies from the government to maintain the financial solvency of in-
man private lnvestment in Developing Countries，" 1ntere氾onom-
主， No.10， 1966， p.13; Dyson，"The state， Banks， and lndus-
tries，" pp.301・302; Herbert Oberbeck and Martin Baethge， 
“Computer and Pinstripes: Financial lndustries，" in Peter ]. 
Katzenstein， ed.， 1ndustry and Politics in West Germany: To-
ward the Third Republic (Ithaca: Cornell University Press， 
1989); ]effrey A. Hart， Rival Capitalists: ln白rnationalCom-
petitiveness in the United States， ]apan， and Western Europe 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press， 1992)， p.187; ]eremy Ed-
wards and Kalus Fischer. Banks. Finance and Investment in 
Ger旦担y.(Cambridge: Cambri匂eUniversity Press， 1994). 
(71) UNCTC， Transnational Banks and the lnternational Debt Cri-
cis (New York: UN， 1991)， p.119; Glenn Whitney，“Big Frank-
furt Banks Concentrate Power，" The Wall Street ] ourna1， May 





Corporatism and Development Cooperation Policy in Germany (Kato) 
dustries involved in developing countries. They do so because of 
their institutionally guaranteed presence in public decision-making 
bodies such as the Hermes (insurance) or the Reconstruction Loan 
Corporation (KfW) that deal with development finance. According 
to Spindler : 
Although voting rights on this (the Hermes intema-
tional) committee extend only to senior civil servants 
representing the Ministry of Economics， Finance， For悶
eign Affairs， and Economic Cooperation， bankers and 
export industry representatives participate in commit-
tee sessions as advisory members. Bankers also sit in 
an advisory capacity on the interministerial committee 
handling insurance for direct foreign investments. The 
boards of public institutions， such as the KfW， provide 
bankers further organized access to foreign policy for同
mulators. Prominent bankers as well as industrialists 
also frequently sit on formal advisory councils to the 
federal ministries. The most important such body with 
respect to foreign economic policy has been the For-
eign Trade Advisory Council of the Ministry of Eco-
nomics， whose forty-one members recently included 
five bankers and seventeen directors of export-oriented 
industrial corporations.(7:l) 
This corporatist mechanism， permits the German banks to induce 
the govemment to provide a safetyア netfor domestic industries 
which are engaged in business with developing countries while shar‘ 
ing the risks much less than is the case in Japan. 
????
(73) Spindler， The Politics of Intemational Credit， p.33. 
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(2) The Reconstruction Loan Corporation (KfW) 
While pubIic financial institutions in Japan have served as me司
diators of international capital re-distribution， their German coun-
terparts have assumed the domestic re distributional function of 
transferring tax-payers'money to German exporters engaged in de-
veloping countries. German ODA and export credits provided by 
the KfW Kredit anstaIt fur Wideraufbau and trade and investment 
insurance underwritten by the Hermes have been available to Ger-
man industries that face risks and uncertainties derived from doing 
business with developing countries. 
The KfW uses federal and state budgets to finance German de-
velopment cooperation toward developing countries. The KfW was 
established in 1948 to finance the reconstruction of Germany's post司
war economy by means of low interest investment loans_ These do-
mestic activities were expanded in 1955 when the KfW started to fi-
nance German exports， and in 1961 when development loans and 
grants for developing countries were added to KfW's activities. In 
this sense， the KfW combines functions of three Japanese official fi-
nancial institutions :出eOECF， which extends ODA loans to devel-
oping countries， the Exim Bank， which provides export credits and 
investment Ioans， and the Japan Development Bank， which makes 
investment loans for domestic research and development. In gen-
eral， the financial resourc田 forimplementing al German foreign 
aid， which includes ODA loans， grants， contributions to multilateral 
organizations， and technical cooperation， consist of federal (both 
Ordinary and Extraordinary) and state budgets， which together ac-
count for about 75 percent of total ODA. The rest is provided 
??
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through special funds such as the V olkswagen Foundation (funds 
from the privatization of V.W.)， the lndustrial Loan， and European 
aid田the which Funds， Counterpart (ERP) Program Recovery 
implementing agencies are obliged to repay. 
Borrowing makes up a much smaller portion of ODA in Ger】
many than it does in J apan， where the FILP contributes around 40 
1'he KfW's capital fund to provide ODA percent of total ODA. 
loans and buyers'credits， which was DM 1 billion as of 1991， has 
been filled by the Federal government (80 percent) and by the states 
1'he funds from the ERP Special Fund， which accrues (20 percent). 
interest and is administered byア theFederal Ministry of Economic 
Affairs， have been used only for financing domestic investment pro-
Borrowing jects in Germany and for long-term export transactions. 
from the ERP has made up only about 20 percent of KfW's export 
Since 1979， ODA loans have depended exclu-credits since 1960. 
sively on the federal and state budgets， and before that， only around 
1'hus 10 percent of German aid loans was replenished by the ERP. 
while ]apan's Exim Bank and OECF have relied on borrowing for 
almost half of their financial activities， German export credits and 
ODA have shown a very low dependence on borrowing鴨IH)
1'he interest of the German private sector， especially banking， 
(74) KfW， I坦旦担nsa旦d主旦k主， (Frankfurt: KfW， May 1991); 
United Nations， Exp笠tsCre出~， 1967， pp.21-23; Kaigai Keizai 
Kyoryoku Kikin (OECF)， !組担iK盟主芝生1堕笠担， 1990 (1'0-
kyo: OECF)， pp.282-301; OECD， 1'he Export Credit Financing 
註旦坦， 1970， pp.55-61， 1982， p.107， 1990， p.57; Glagow， et al， 
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in expanding exports is ref1ected in the KfW's board of directors. 
The fact that Hermam Abs of the Deutsche Bank became the first 
chairman of the KfW demonstrates the corporatist networks be-
tween the banks and出egovernment.(75) The board represents the 
interests of federal ministries (6 members)， state governments (5 
members from the Bundesrat)， the Bundesbank， and the private sec-
tor (16 members from commercial banks， industry， agriculture， 
crafts， trade， and trade unions).州 Theprivate sectors'inf1uence has 
been ref1ected in various policies of the KfW. For example， as of 
June 1980， the list of developing countri田 bo出 recognizedby the 
KfW and receiving substantial credits to purchase German exports 
was also a list of those with which German business maintained 
strong relations， such as Algeria， Argentina， Brazil， Columbia， 
Greece， lndonesia， Malaysia， Mexico， Morocco， Peru， the Philip-
pines， Portugal， Rumania， Spain， Syria， Taiwan， Thailand， Vene-
zuela， and Yugoslavia. Especially when the economy was in reces-
sion， as in the early 1980 s and 1990 s， the board of the KfW legiti-
mated the increased use of mixed credits that combined ODA and 
export credits to promote German exports. Partly due to these 
mixed credits， the share of tied aid in bilateral German ODA in-
creased to over 50 percent in the early 190s.(7) 
(75) Dyson，“The State， Banks， and lndustries，" p.130. 
(76) The chairman and vice-chairman of the board of management 
are appointed by the Federal Chancellor， and the board ap-
points the management. 
(7) Spindler， The Politics of International Credit， pp.52・55;OECD， 
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(3) 丁heExport Credit Joint Company (AKA) 
The Export Credit Joint Company (A附舟'hrkreditAktienge-
sellscht:.β， AKA) is a private corporation established in 1952 by the 
big three private banks--the Deutsche Bank， the Dre部sdnerBank and 
the Commeぽrzbankι.イlineother private banks， and eleven regional， 
state and local government banks for the purpose of financing 
medium-term supplier credits. As of the late 1980s， AKA comprised 
54 commercial banks. Since the KfW emphasizes buyer credits， un-
like“AKA's supplier credits， these financial institutions have been 
regarded as mutually supplementary. As in the case of KfW， AKA 
resources for exports to developing countries depend to some extent 
on federal money. Of the three types of loans offered， funds for one 
are obtained from a rediscount ceiling granted to the AKA by the 
Deutsche Bundesbank. Approval must be obtained from the central 
bank in advance of loan commitment. A total of DM 5 billion was 
made available through this facility in the late 1980s. In contrast， 
the Exim Bank of Japan cannot borrow from or rediscount with the 
Bank of J apan. This credit line can therefore be regarded as a 
cheap， government-assisted source of refinance出atreduces private 
sector risk. (刊}
一
(4) The German Development Company (DEG) 
Like the KfW， the German Development Company Deutsche In-
vestitions und En伽icklungsgesellscha.九DEG)has been entirely feder-四一
??
(78) OECD， Export Credit Financing Systems， 1987， pp.188・89，1990， 
58-59. 
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ally supported. The DEG was established in 1962 in order to en-
courage FDI by German small.and-medium-sized companies in de-
veloping countries，回peciallyin Africa. While出eDEG seems simi-
lar to the Japan Overseas Development Corporation (JODC)， which 
furnishes part of the capital to Japanese small.and medium-sized 
companies when they establish joint ventur回 indeveloping coun-
tries， the DEG is one of the main arms of German development co・
operation while the JODC is cIearly subsidiary to MITI. In terms of 
importance， the DEG seems to closer to the Exim Bank of J apan， 
though出atinstitution focuses on big busin四s.Unlike either Japa-
nese institution， the DEG makes a rule of granting investment loans 
to foreign companies that construct joint ventures with German 
partners. The increased risks resulting from direct lending to for-
eign borrowers have been shouldered by the federal budget. 
(5) Hermes and Treuarbeit 
Since 1919， official export-credit and investment insurance has 
been provided by two private companies， Hermes Hermes Kreditver-
sichernngs AG and Treuarbeit D仰 tscheRevisions und Treuhand 
AG. They are authorized to provide and manage the insurance 
business in the name of and for the govemment. The Hermes has 
been primarily concerned with export credits， while the Treuarbeit 
has handled investment insurance. (79) The Hermes， which is be- 一
四
(79) Since 1956， two insurance companies have offered purely pri-
vate export credit insurance: Gerling Konzern Spezielle Kredit-
versichernngs AG (GKS) in Cologne and Allgemeine Kreditversi-
cherungs AG (AK) in Mainz. 
? ?
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lieved to be more important to development cooperation， ispri-
vately owned by large insurance companies， while about 70 percent 
of the Treuarbeit is owned by the Federal government and the re-
Appli-maining 30 percent by some states of the Federal Republic. 
cations for guarantees are ruled on by an inter-ministerial commit-
tee， which was established in 1949 and is composed of representa・
tives of al the ministries concemed， business， and the big banks. 
Hermes exchanges contracts with potential investors and exporters 
Unlike in the name of and on behalf of the German government.1削
MITI's universal contracts， most of the coverage is given for single 
transactions， allowing the private sector to buy insurance only for 
Although the ratio of insured exports to highly risky transactions. 
total exports has been much lower in Germany than in Japan (10 
40 percent)， ifonly exports to develoρing countries are percent vs. 
considered， German coverage has in fact been much higher than has 
Hermes' philosophy is that German businessmen should Japanese. 
take risks in the international market， and Hermes should offer 
For the Germans， who are unac-coverage only for the extremes. 
customed to development business， interdependence with developing 
countries has belonged to“the extremes."Si日目出e1970s，Gennan 
(80) Peter Schlechtriem，“Export Credit Guarantees in the Federal 
Republic of Germany，" in Ho Peng Kee and Helena Chan， eds.， 
E喧空位E旦盟主旦旦ιInt塑註iOll弘主旦生E担担豆盟笠旦ι出土
tion) (Singapore: Butterworths， 1990)， p.289. Export credit in-
surance江luStfirst be bought as a condition for receiving the 
KfW's official export credits. While this condition is not ap国
plied to AKA's credits， insurance is usually obtained anyway. 
???
? ?
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insurance for exports to developing countries has accounted for 
about 70 to 80 percent of the total insured volume， while exports to 
communist countries account for around 10 percent. The share of 
industrialized countries has been less than 10 percent. Among de-
veloping countries， Asia has had the largest share， accounting for 
around 30 to 40 percent， followed by Africa， 20 to 30 percent， Latin 
America， 10 to 20 percent， and Europe less than 10 percent， al-
though the latter has， since 1989， skyrocketed to take up 30 percent 
of insured lending.附)
Such an insurance operation should not be sustainable， unless the 
insurance company charges premiums that are highly responsive to 
risks. However， the Hermes does not follow even this most basic 
principle of the insurance business. While MITI's insurance adjusts 
premium rates depending on country risks， Hermes does no such 
thing. After the debt crises in the early 1982， when risks associatf'<I 
with foreign investment in， ancl long-term export transactions with， 
the debt-riclclen countries increased unprecedenteclly， only the Her-
mes continued to charge one premium for a1 countries， even the 
most heavily indebted Latin American countries， where German pri-
(81) Schlechtriem，“Export Credit Guarantees，" pp.306-307; Acle， 
“Die Systeme der Exportkreclitversicherung，" p.130; Hichert， 
St盟主heE浬旦由主注目盟， p.292; Schulz and Hansen，組
空r1型perialis型， p.10; Albert Eiden， "Staatliche Exportkredit-
versicheru昭 als struktur-und ausenpolitisches Instrument: 
Darstellung der bundesdeutschen Praxis und Ubersicht zu 
auslandischen Regelungen，" Diplomarbeit zur Erlangung des 
Grades Diplom-Kaufmann， Rheinisch-W estfaIischen Tech-
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vate business found its closest business partners in the developing 
world. Hermes acted as the last resort for German exports to high苧
risk markets. I出}
N. Conclusion 
German corporatist institutions bring society， whether German 
society or society in developing countries， tothe forefront of Ger凶
man policy related to development cooperation. There has been no 
distinction in Germany between the economic interests of labor or 
business and the development values of NGOs; both have to be sat司
isfied with the public resources of federal and state governments; 
the Germans have been provided with political opportunities to par-
ticipate in the formation of economic policy toward developing 
countries and transform it into internationa! societa! poIicy. 
(82) OECD，旦主portCredit Financingむ註担ち 1990，pp.62 and 217; 
G. G. Johnson， Matthew Fisher， and EIIiot Harris， Q盟豆豆ly
邑pportedExport Cr吋its:Develop型旦EE2EdE盟主E盟~， World 
Economic and Financial Survey (Washington， DC.: Interna棒
tiona! Monetary Fund， 1990)， p.6. 
